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S.: Rights of Tenant in Common Where Oil Is Extracted Under Unauthori
EDITORIAL NOTES

sense treatment of the original wound. In relation to the act of
the defendant, it is an independent intervening act-as much so
as if the deceased had been maliciously wounded by another person than the accused-and is only casually consequent upon either
the original wound or the incision. Hence, as the court instructed
the jury, if the removal of the appendix was the sole cause of
death, the defendant is not guilty. However, where the independent act of another party intervenes, it shifts liability from the
original assailant only where it is the sole cause of death. Although
removal of the appendix may have been a contributing cause of
death, still, if the wound inflicted by the defendant contributed
to the death, he is guilty. And it necessarily follows from what
has been said that, if either the original wound, or the incision and
its proximate consequences (provided the incision was proper treatment of the wound), contributed with the removal of the appendix
to produce death, the defendant is guilty of homicide. In othey
words, the original wound may be a contributing cause, either di.
rectly or through its proximate consequences as manifested in the
intervening act. Hence, the Court properly refused the defendant's instructions.
-L. C.

RIGHTS OF TENANT IN COMMON WHERE OIL IS EXTRACTED UNDER

UNAUTHORIZED LEASE FROM Co-TENANT.-In Paxton v. BenedumTrees Oil Co.," it is apparently held, where one tenant in common
of the oil and gas in place under certain land makes an oil and
gas lease without the consent of his co-tenant, and the lessee enters
and produces oil under the lease, that, on an accounting against
the lessor and lessee the co-tenant can recover as damages only
one-eighth of his share of the oil taken from the land. In this case
the wronged co-tenant, Kemper by name, apparently was not a
party to the suit though the decision purports to adjudicate his
rights. It would seem that since the lessee and lessor are liable
for waste under the statute, if there was not a wilful violation of
Kemper's rights, then he ought to have the right to elect to take
either the value of the oil at the surface of the ground less the
reasonable cost of production2 or his proportionate share of the
194 S. E. 472

(W. Va. 1917).

sWilliamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411 (1897); McNeely V. South
Penn Oil Co., 58 W. Va. 438, 52 S. E. 480 (1905).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1918

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [1918], Art. 6

WE ST

VIGINIA

LAW

QUARTERLY

royalty provided by the lease.8 If the lessee's acts were in wilful
disregard of Kemper's interest it would seem the latter might be
allowed his share of the oil free from the cost of production.4 The
suit was brought by the lessor, against the lessee on the ground the
lessor was entitled to one-eighth of fifteen sixteenths of the oil as
royalty, while the lessee apparently contended that Kemper was
entitled to one-sixteenth of the oil, and as the lessor was guilty of
a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, he would be
entitled to one-sixteenth of the oil as royalty or one-half the royalty
provided by the lease. Both parties apparently considered Kemper
the owner of only one-sixteenth of the oil in place.
The statement in the opinion that the lessor was guilty of a
breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment seems to be
erroneous, for it does not appear that the lessee's enjoyment had
been disturbed. However, since there was a breach of the implied
covenant of title and this covenant was broken as soon as the lease
was executed, the resulting damages would be the same as if the
covenant of quiet enjoyment had been broken. The decree in the
lower court gave the plaintiff one-sixteenth of the oil as his share
of the royalty, but the grounds of the decision do not appear. This
decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals on the ground
that Kemper owned one half of the oil in place and on accounting
would be entitled to the usual royalty of one eighth and therefore
would be entitled to one sixteenth of the oil produced or one eighth
of one half. The court may have intended to base this decision on
the ground that Kemper had by acts and conduct ratified the lease,
and if so, the decision is certainly correct as to this point, but
while it is suggested that a wronged co-tenant might ratify the
lease in such a case the language used seems to indicate that the
court intended to lay down the above rule as the correct rule of
damages to be applied where the rights of a tenant in common of
oil and gas in place have been thus invaded. The ease of Kilcoyne
'See McNeely v. South Penn Oil Co., supra. This seems in fact the holding of Ithe
court in South Penn Oil Co. v. Haught, 71 W. Va. 720, 78 S. E. 759 (1913).
'See cases cited in note 2. It would seem the measure 'of damages for the wrongful
taking of oil in the principal case ought to be the same as where oil is wrongfully
taken by one who is not a tenant in common. In such case it seems the measure
of damages in case of a wilful taking is the value of the bil taken without deduction for the cost

of

production.

Gladys

City

0il,

Gas &

Manufacturing Co. 'V.

Right of Way Oil Co., 137 S. W. 171 (Tex. 1911). Where the taking is under an
honest mistake the measure of damages is the value of the oil less the cost of prodtiction. Campbell v. Smith, 180 Ind. 159, 101 N. E. 69 (1913).
As to the measure of damages for the wrongful working of mines see notes in 26 Ann. Cas. 562 and
8 Ann. Cas. 43.
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v. Southern Oil Oo.5 is disapproved and it is a decision which would
have no application had the court intended to base its decision on
the ratification of the lease by Kemper. If the court did intend to
hold that a wronged tenant in common whose oil has been taken by
a lessee under a lease by his co-tenant can recover as damages only
the usual royalty provided in oil and gas leases, it is submitted
that the decision is unsound.0 If the tenant in common owns an
undivided half the oil in the ground it is hard to see why he
should lose seven eighths of his property because a lessee of his cotenant wrongfully extracts his oil and why the parties guilty of
the tort should in such case be permitted to profit from their own
wrong. Why may not the wronged party base his action on the
tort instead of being compelled to ratify the contract? The above
remarks are made with some diffidence because the writer is not
sure that it was not the intention of the court to hold Kemper had
ratified the lease.
-J. W. S.

CAN A LESSEE BE COMPELLED TO APPORTION OIL ROYALTIEs

PREMIsES.-Since the
publication of the note on the apportionment of oil and gas royalties in the WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY,' a criticism
of the principles contended for in the note has been made by the
counsel for a large oil and gas company which operates in a sister
state. He contends that the cases of Wetengel v. Gormley2 and
Campbell v. Lynch3 are correctly decided because these cases inAMONG OWNERS OF PORTIONS OF THE LEASED

661 W. Va. 538, 56 S. E. 888 (1907).
The rule as stated by the court in the
principal case also seems inconsistent with williamson v. Jones, supra and McNeely v.
South Penn Oil Co., supra.
GThe cases apparently relied on as authorities are South Penn Oil Co. V. Haught,
71 W. Vs. 720, 78 S. E. 759 (1913) and Cecil v. Clark, 49 -W. Va. 459, 39 S. E.
In the former case the court allowed recovery of the usual royalty
202 (1901).
where it .appeared the cost of production largely exceeded the value of the oil produced. In the latter the plaintiffs sued to recover a share of the royalties which
had been paid to the defendant by the lessee, hence the lease had lbeen ratified by
the plaintiffs. It is submitted these two cases tend to support the statement heretofore made that the injured party should have he right to elect whether to proceed on the theory of tort or on the contract.
'25 W. VA L. Q. 231.
2160 Pa. St. 559, 28 Ati. 934 (1894), and 184 Pa. St. 354, 34 At. 57 (1998).
S94 S. E. 739 (W. Va. 1918). A note on this case appeared in a recent number
of the HARVARr LAw RvEw. See 31 HAP.v. L. Rnv. 882. In this note it is stated
the result reached is sound because the right to the royalties at the time of the partition was contingent on the discovery of oil and therefore there was nothing to
partition but the land, and when the right to the royalties did vest it vested in all
the heirs in common. But it 'was stated that had the right to thd royalties been
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